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Rosetta Stone Ltd. respectfully submits this ieply brief in support of its motion for partial
summary judgment as to liability_ For the reasons that follow, Rosetta Stone's mot ion should be

granted.
INTRODUCTION
Rosetta Stone establ ished that it is entitled to summary judgment as to Ilability because
there are no genuine issues of material fac[ as to Google 's violations of the Lanham Act and
Virginia law:
•

Google is directly liable for trademark infringement because Google uses the '
Roserta Stone Marks l in .E. maWler that is likely to confuse - and in fact has
. confused - consumers.

•

Google is liable fo r the trademark infringement of its customers 'because (i) it
in~entionally induces its customers to infringe the Rosetta Stone Marks, (ii) it
continues to · sell Sponsored Links to entities that it knows are engaging in
trademark infringement, and (iii) it has the legal right and practical ability to stop
the infringing conduct yet fa ils to do so.

o

Google is liable for trademark dilution because its conduct has resulted in the
blwring and tarnislullent of the Rosetta S!one Marks.

e

.

Googie has been unjustly enric hed because it kno wing ly uses and sells the Rosetta
Stone Marks for its own pro fit without compensating Rosetta Stone.

In its efforts to avoid summary judgment. Google overstates Rosetta Stone's claims, understates
its own conduct, avoids the elements of trademark infringement and urges the Coun to simply
ignore the overwhelming evidence which establishes thar confusio n arises from Google' s sale of
·the Rosetta Stone Marks as keywo rds. As discussed below, notwithstanding Google's attempts
to blur the matters before the Court, app lication of governing law to the undisputed facts compels
the conclusion that Rosena Stone is enritled to summary judgment as to liability.

The "Rosetta Stone Marks" include ROSETTA STONE, ROSETI A STONE LANGUAGE
LEARNING SUCCESS, ROSETTASTONE.COM and ROSETI A WORLD.
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ARGUMENT

l.

ROSETTA STONE

a>;.s PROVED DlRECT TRA.DEMAK'C LIABILITY

To prove a claim for direct infringement, Rosetta Stone must demonstrate that (I) it
possesses the Rosetta Stone Marks; (2) Google used the Rosetta Stone r..,larks; (3) GoogIe's use
of the Marks occurred in commerce; (4) Google used the: Marks in connection with the sale,
offering for sale. distribution, or adverti5ing of goods and services; and (5) Google used the

Marks in a manner likely

lO

confuse consumers. 15 V.S.C § 1114; PETA ". Doughlley, 263 F.3d

359, 364 (4thCir. 2001).
A.

Google Does Not Dispute That The First Fo ur Elements Of A Trademark
Infringement Claim Are Met

Google does not dispute that the first four elements are met here.

Nor could it.

Numerous courts have held that Google's sale of trademarks as keywords constitutes a use in

corrunerce in connection with the sale, offcriJ1g for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods and
services. See. e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009); Goagle. [nc. v.
Am. Blind & Wal/paper, No. C 03-5340 JF (RS), 2007 WL 1159950 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18,2007);

GEICO v. Google. Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004).

B.

The Record Evidence inmoDstrates That Google Uses The Rosetta Stone
Marks In A £\1anner Likelv To Confuse Consumers

The only open issue with respect to trademark infringement is whether Google used the
Rosetta Stone Marks in a manner likely to confuse consumers. See Rescuecom, 562 FJd at 130-

31 (stating that Lanham Act vio lation will lie if Google's use of trademark "in its AdWords
program causes likelihood of confusion or mistaken and denying motion to dismiss where
likelihood of confusion was sufficiently aUcged). Contrary to Google's assertion that Rosetta

Stone has not met its burden, the record evidence establishes confusion in several ways. (See
Dkt. 104, Rosetta Stano Mem. at 17-24.)

2
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1.

Rosetta Stone Prooerlv Defi!led Its COilfus!on Barden

First, Google argues that "Rosetta Stone's theory of direct liability against Google is
premised on initial interest confusion.," which Google asserts is not actionable in this Circuit.
(Dkt. 153, Opp'n. at 9-12.) Google's argumenr is

flawe~

in two respectS. As a lh..Ieshold matter,

the likelihood of confusion estabiisbed in Rosetta Stone's motion for partial summary judgment
is not initial interest confusion but the likelihood that Google ' s use of the Rosena Stone Marks
will "confuse an (ordinary consumer' as to the source or sponsorship of the goods.'" PETA, 263

F.3d at 366. As explaincd below, Roserta Stone has carried its burden with respect to this issue.
Accordingly, Google's interjection of the initial interest confusion theory is largely beside the

In addition, while the Fourth Circuit declined to endorse the initial mtere..<:;t confusion
theort ir! Lamparello v. Falwell, it has not rejected it. 420 F.3d 309, 316-18 (4th C~. 2005). In
fact, the Lamparello court discussed at some length initial

in[eres~

confusion, expJaining that the

doctrine applies only in cases involving "one business:s use of another's mark for its own

fmancial gain" and therefore would provide no basis for liability in the case before it. Id. at 317.
In analyzing cases that have adopted the doctrine, the Lamparello court recognized tbat the
appellate courts "have only applied it to profit-seeking uses of another's mark" whereas "the

district courts have not so limited the application of the theory." Id. at 318 n.6. The court stated
its view that the district court cases "were wrongly decided," but did not criticize or question the
appellate court decisions.

Thus, while Lamparello declined

(0

endorse the initial interest

confusion doctrine on the facts before it, the court's analysis leaves open the question whether

Indeed, notwithstanding Google's statement at page 9 that Rosetta Stone's theory of direct
liabili ty is premised on initial interest confusion, Google subsequently statcs that "the
confusion ar issue in this case is confusion as to source of goads.': (Opp'n at 18 u.S .)

3

6508

the doctrirle applies to cases, such as this one, where the defendant uses the plaintiff's mark for

its own flIlancial gab. 3 As the Fourth Circuit recognized, numerous courts have adopted the
doctrine in such circumstances.

See Lamparello, 520 F.3d at 317 (citing PACA.AR Inc. v.

Telescall Teehs. , L.L.c., 319 F.3d 243, 253 (6th Cir. '2003), and Promalek Indus., Lid. \'.
Equitrae Corp., 300 F,3d 808, BI2 (7th Gir. 2002)]; see also Playboy Enters., Illc. v. NelScape
CommC1T's Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying initial interest confusion 10

claim by markholder against internet search engine thai: sold pla intiffs mark as a keyword to
third parties); GEICO v, Google, Inc., No. 1:04GVS07, 2005 WI.. 1903128, at *4 (E.D, Va. Aug.
8, 2005) (applying initial interest confusion to claim by markholder against Gocgle based on
Google's sale of plaintiffs mark as a keyword to third panies).
2.

Coofusion Is Presumed As A Matter Of Law

Google also argues

that

confusion cannot be presumed because the presumption of

confusion that arises when a defendant lnlenl ionally copies a protected mark applies only «where
the defendant intentionally copies the plaintiffs mark for its use on its own competitive products
with the intent to confuse or deceive the public." (Opp'n at 12.) Noither of the cases cited by

Google supports such a limited view of this presumption. Shakespeare Company v. Sf/star
Corporation of America expressly states that the presumption arises "when the copier intends to

exploit the good will created by an already registered trademark." 110 F.3d 234, 237 (4th Cir.

2007) (quotation omitted). Here, the record demonstrates that Google intended to exploit the

goodwill created by the Rosetta Stone Marks (and ali other trademarks) in 2004 when it

In Carl v. bernardjcarl.com, 662 F. Supp. 2d 487 re.D. Va. 2009), the defendants did not use
plaintiffs mark for their own financial gair. Rather they purchased a web domain bearing
plaintiffs name and posted cOlTespondence at the domain in an attempt to communicate with
the plaintiff. Id, at 491.

4
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affIrmat ively' decided to pewjt its customers to bid on the Marks and then again in 2009 wh~n it
affrrmat iv.ely decided to permit certain customers to use the Marks in their Sponsored Links.
(Ok!. 104, Undisputed Facis ("UF'') 16-17,24-25.) In Anhellser-Busch, Inc. v. L&L WilIgs, inc. ,
the court held the presump tion inappropriate where the. defendant used plaintiffs mark for the
purpose of parody. 962 F.2d 316, 32 1-22 (4th Cir. 1992). Google, of course, is no t using the
Rosetta Stone Marks for parody and its reliance on such case law is misplaced.
Google then rejects as :'i.napplicable" all the cases cited by Rosetta Stone on the ground
that they involve either competitors or counterfeiters. (Opp'n at 12.) Goog!e misses the point.
The fact that "Google does not provide competing or counterfeit goods," (id.), does not change
the fact Ihat Google displays on its search-results pages Spor..sored Links for counterfeit goods
and allows those Sponsored Links to use Rosetta Stone Marks as k.eyword triggers and

mtheir

tex.t. Such Sponsored Links are presumptively confusing. See Phillip lv/orris US.A., Inc. v.

Shalabi, 352 f. Supp. 2d 1067, 1073 (C.D. Cal 2004) ("[ejounterfeit marks are inherently
confusing."); Cucci Anl, Illc. v. Duty Free Apparel, 286F. Supp. 2d 284, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
('lejounterfcits, by their very nalure, cause confusion."); Fila U.S.A .. Inc.

v.

Kim, 884 F. Supp.

491,494 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (same).

Google, moreover, completely ignores the two other circumstances in which confusion

.

~

will be presumed, both of which are present here:

(i) using identical marks in the same

. geographic area for the same class of goods or services and (ii) using a domain name that is
identical to someone else's trademark. (See UF 10-17, 19,24,28, 35-37.t

,

Although Google purports to address the use of the Rosetta Stone Marks "in post-domain
URL addresses," (Opp'n at 13- 14), it completely ignores the undisputed fact that many o f the
Sponsored Links displayed by Google contain the Rosetla Stone Marks in their actual
domain names. (UF 35.) Moreover, although Google asserts that the use of marks in postdomain URL addresses is functional and serves orJy to identify a u!,\ique internet address

-~

.

5
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In short, Google has not sufficiently rebutted the presumption of confusion th"t arises
from its use of the Rosetta Stone Marks.
3.

Google's Use Of The Rosetta Stone Marks Result, In A Likelihood Of
Confusion

Finally, Google argues that Rosetta Stone has nor demonstrated that Google'5 use of the
Rosetta Stone Marks results in • likelihood of confusion. (Opp'n at 14-23.) Google's analysis,
however is fatally flawed for several reasons. First, Google does not apply or even set tanh the

nine-factor test utilized in this Circuit to assess likelihood of confusion. instead, without citation

to a single case, Google applies a three-factor test consisting of "intent of actual confusion [sic],
intent, and consumer sDphistication." (Id. at 14.)

Second, Google's analysis is improper because Google presents its Sponsored Links in
isolation and out of context. For instance, in addressing purported "ads for genuine ,goods,"
Google separately addresses cherry-picked examples of Sponsored Links for reseUers,
competitors, informational sites and sites unrelated to language educa tion.

(Id. at {5-24.)

Google thus frames the confusion question in a piecemeal fashion that has no relation to the
reality ofwhat appears on Google's search-results pages or Google's practices as a whole.
Indeed, the cases cited by Google do nol support its myopic approach and instead require
that the Court analyze Google's conduct in context. In CareFirst of Nfaryland, Inc. v. First (:'are,
P. C . the Fourth Circuit stated that it must "examine the allegedly infri.nging use in the context in

which it is seen by the ordinary consumer." 43 4 F.3d 263,271 (4th Cir. 2006). The Court thus

(cont 'd from pre"'ious pag~)

(Opp'n at 13-14), its own website states that "[t]he display URL path does not have to be a
functioning page of your actual website." (Dk!. 149, 4/9ilO Spaziano Ex. 44.) Google even
advises its customers to make up a post-domain display URL to "complement your ad's
message" by, for example, "highlighting the brand name." (Id.)

6
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concluded that it was not per.nissibie to simply look at the maks themselves; it had to look at the
mnrks "in th~ marketplace."

fd. Likewise, in Johnson & Johnsoll Vision Care, inc. v. 1~800

Contacts, 1nc., the court stated that "a COUrt must analyze the message conveyed in full context"
and "must view the face of the Slatement in. its entirety, rather than examining the eyes. nose, and
mouth separately and in isolation from each other." 299 F.3d 1242, 1248 (llth Cir. 2002)
(quotations omined); see also Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 316 (determining likelihood of confusion
requires "examining the allegedly infringing usc ;'1 the context in .....,hich it is seen by the ordinary
cO/1Sumer")

(quotation omitted) (emphasis in original).

The entire premise of"Goagle's presentation thus is fundamentally flawed - the Court
may not look at each Sponsored Link out of context, but must consider Google's practices as a
,,,·bole. Indeed, Google's Opposition is based on the faulty premise that Rosetta Stone merely
challenges specific Sponsored Links that appear on Google's search-results pages. While many
of these Sponsored Links ceJ1ainly do infringe the Rosetta Stone Marks, and help establish
GoogJe's liability for trademark infringement, what -Rosetta Stone is challenging is Google's
practice of selling the Rosetta Stone Marks to third parties to use as keyv.'ords and in the content
of their Sponsored Links, and then displaYL'1g those Sponsored Links when a user queries a
Rosetta Stone Mark.

In this regard, Rosetta Stone does not dispute that rescUers, affiliates,

competito rs and informational sites can, in some circumstances, lawfully refer to Rosena Stone .
. (See Opp 'n at 15-1 8.) However, Google's practice of allowing

an third parties to bid on and use

the Rosetta Stone Marks is impermissible as it results in a likelihood of consumer confusion.
Vvben Google's practices are properly considered in context. ;:here can be no question that

likelihood of confusion has been establisned. Rosetta Stone has established actual confusion,
which both parties agree is "of paramount importance" and "th:: best evidence" of likelihood of

7

6512

,

confusion. COPP·I'. at IS.) C--oogle's own internal studies d-emonstrate that internet users a.re

confused (i) by Sponsored Links as consumers frequently cannot distinguish between Sponsored
Links and organic search results; and (ii) by the use of trademarks ;'1 Sponsored Link text. (UF
18,20.) Google does not - because it cannot - dispu[e these findings. (Opp 'n at 18-19.) As to

the former studies, Google staies without any suppon that confusion between organic and
Sponsored Links has "nothing to do

wit~

whether users are confused as to the source or origin of

Rosetta Stone's products." (Id. at 18 lLS.) Such assertion flies in the face of Goagle's clail"ns
that its organic search engLl1e identifies the most relevant sites in response to a user query. A
user who is "unable to differentiate [the top Sponsored Links] from organic search results," (UF

18), necessarily believes that the top Sponsored Link is the top - i.e., most

rcl~vant

- organic

search result. As to the latter studies, Google says that they are irrelevant because they did not
address Sponsored Links using the Rosetta Stone Marks.

(Opp'n at lB.) The conclusions

rcached in those studies, however, were not mark-specific, and Googie, in fact, relied on the
conclusions in deciding not to permit customers to use trademarks in

Sponsor~

Link. text. (UF

2 1.22.) Having based its 2004 policies on these studies, Google cannot now assert that they have

no relevance to Google's practices.
In addition to. the conf.lsion evidenced by Google's internal stuuies, Rosetta Stone
present=d the testimony of Google's current and former Chief Trademark COUl1se! Terri Chen
and Rose Hagan. At their depositions, each witness VIas presented with a Google search-results
page for a search of "Rosetta Stone."

Neither Google witness could tell that three of the

Sponsored Links displa>-ed on the search-results page were not reseUers of genuine Rosena
Stone software. (UF 43.) In response, Google asserts that these individuals cannot qualify as
"actually confused" because Ro:s:e~a Stone has no evidence th<3t either is in Ihe relevant pool of

8
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consumers. (Opp'n at 24 n.9.) Yet, Google itself asserts that "Rosetta Stone's target market is
better educated and has higher income levels than the general U.S. population." (ld. a! 8.)5
Undoubtedly, Ms. Hagan and Ms. Chen fall within this targe, market. In any event, if Gciogle's

own Chief Trademark Counsel, who flrc well-versed in ~he use of trademarks, are confused as to
the source of the goods advertised in Google's Sponsored Links, how can Google expect its users
- irrespective of their level ofsophisrication - not to be confused?
In fact, the record evidence:: demonstrates that Goog]e users indeed are confused as to the
source of the goods advertised in Google's Sponsored Links. Five individual

Consum~fs

- each a

coUege gr.aduare and two with advanced degrees - have testified that they were confused by a

,

Sponsored Link displayed on a Google search-results page when they conducted a search for
"Rosetta Stone," leading them to do business with companies that they believed were sponsored
by Rosetta Stone and to buy what they thought was genuine Rosetta Stone product bur which, in
fact, was counterfeit software.

(UF 42.)6 Relying (In George & Co., LLC v. imagination

Entertainment Ltd, 575 F.3d 383 (4th Cir. 2009), Gobgle asserts thar in assessing the weight of

the testimony of ihese individuals, the court should consider the fact that "more than

Google makes this stateme..'1t in its "Counter-Statement of Undisputed Facts." Rosetta Stone
does not agree with Google's characterization oftbe facls set forth i.'1 this Counter-Statement
and maintains that [hey are not relevant to the issues presented in this case.
Conirary to Google's assertion, all five individuals purchased counterfeit product. Although
Diana Stanley Thomas could not locate the software she purchased at the time of her
deposition, she purchased the product from soureeplaza.com (Tbomas Dep. at 20:20-22), the
same website from which Denis Doyle purchased his counterfeit software (Doyle Dep. at
16:6-8). Moreover, although Steve DuBow could not confirm at his deposition where the
link from which he purcbased counterfeit 50 ftware appeared, his records show that he
purchased the software on October 6, 2009 from bossdisk.com(Dkt. 149,4/9110 Spaziano Ex.
53 , DuBow Ex.. 2), a Sponsored Link about which Rosetta Stone complained to Googlc on
October 6, 2009 (Dkt 149 ,4/9/10 Spaziano Ex. 43 ~t GOOG-RS-0310697).

9
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100:000,000 Rosetta Stone ad impressions were served since 2004."

(Opp'n at 22-23 .)7

Hcw ever, ''[W]ithOllt knowing how many, or what percent of, incidents go unreported, anecdotal

evidence of confusion cannot usefully be compared to the universe of potential incidents of
confusion. The rarity of such evi dence makes e:ven a few incidents <highly probat ive of lhe

likelihood of confusion.''' KDs Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 720 (3d Cir.
2004) (quoting Checkpoint Sys., Inc.· v. Check Point Sofrware Tech , Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 291 Od
Cir. 2001 » (rejecting argument that 60 reported incidents of confusion was too small a
percentage of the approximatety 650,000 prescrip[ions); see also Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-

ROlher Corp., 81 F.3d 455,466·67 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[llndeed, we can but wonder how often the
experiences related by the trial witnesses have been repeated - but not reported - in stores across
the country."). S Moreover, contrary to Google's assertion, the "totality of Rosetta Stone's
evidence" extends far beyond the testimony of these five witnesses (Opp'n a[ 23), and includes,

as discussed above: Google's own studies, testimony and admissions.
established actual confusion.

Rosetta Stone has

.

000gle'5 statement is misleading because, among other reasons, the reponed figure appears
to include all of the impressions generated by Rosetta Stone's own Sponsored Links.
Relying on the declaration of Thai Le, Google disputes Rosetta Stone's Undisputed Facts 40
and 41, which evidence actual confusion, claiming that most of the complaints logged in
Rosetta Stone's databases do not reference Google. (Opp'n at 16-17; Dkt 152, Le DecL j As
explained in the dec laration of Jason Calhoun (Okt 106), the focus of Rosetta Stone's
customer care representatives is on customer satisfaction - not determining whether the
individual found the counterfeit sites through a Google Sponsored Link. (Calhoun Decl. 19.)
Likewise, Rosetta Stone's web-based system is not designed to ask customers about
confusion or to delermine if a search engine led the individual to the counterfeit site. ([d. ~
to.) The "graphical presentations" prepared by Me. Le are consistent with these facts. (See,
e.g., Dkt. 152, Le Dec!. 113 (showing that 86% of the Pararure complaints logged between
December 2009 and April 2010 had only general entries of "fraud" or "piracy").)
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Rosetta Stone, moreover, established that the remaining eight confusion fac.tois all
strongly faver a flnding of confusion here. (Rosetta Stone Mem a'£ 21-24.) Google does not
dispute that factors 1 (the strength of distinctiveness of the mark), 2 (the similarity of the [Wo
marks), 3 (the slmiiarity of the goods and services that. the marks identify), 4 (the simllarity of
the facilities tbat the two panies use in their businesses), 5 (the similarity 0 f the advertising the
two parties usel and 8 (the quality of the defendant's product) aU favor a finding of confusion.
Instead, Google argues [hat these factors are largely irrelevant and that the court should instead
focus only on factors 6 (the defendant's intent.) and 9 (the sophistication of the consuming
public). As discussed below, however, even were Google correct in its unsupported assertiun
regarding the factors that are relevant to its practices, these factors also favor a fmding of

confusion. 9
With respect to intent, Ooogle asserts that there is no "evidence in the record that Google
intended to confuse potential purcbasers of Rosetta Stone's products," (Opp' n at 19.) GoogIe,
however, intentionally entices its customers to bid oil the Rosetta Stone Marks and to use the
Rosetta Stone Marks in Sponsored Link text because Google knows that branded keywords, such
as trademarks, result in higher click- through rates than non-branded keywords 3nd that higher
click-through rates equate to greater profits. (UF 30-33.l

Google thus affirmatively - and

intentionally - use::s the Rosena Stone Marks to drive internet traffic away from Rosetta Stone

•

Notably, the factors that Google claims are not relevant to the Court's assessment of
likelihood of confusion are those that are necessarily admitted by Google's practices:
Google uses the exact same marks on the exact same search-results p2ges to permit its
customers to sell the exact same products. Rosetta Stone respectfully submits that the fact
that the exact Rosetta Stone ~1arks are being used weighs strongly in favor of likeliliood of
confusion, thereby rendering the other factors of less significance. See Brookfield Commc 'I1S
v. West Coast Elllm'/, 174 F.3d 1036, 1056 (9th Cir. 1999) (where there is a "virtual identity
of marks" used with the same type of product "likelihood of confusion wou ld follow as a
m2tter of course").
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and to the s ites of Google' s customers. Google, moreover, certainly "intended to capitalize on
the good . . . ' ill associated with" tht: Rosetta Stone Marks. CareFirSl all'vtd., 434 F.3d at 273.
With respect
record evidence.

[0

the sophistication of the consuming public, Google simp ly ignores the

Irrespective of the education and wea lch of Rosetta Stone custo mers, the

undisputed facts demonstrate that even ",sophisticated" consumers are confused by Google' s
SponslJred Links: Rosetta Stone deposed five college·educated consumers who were confused

by Goog le's Sponsored Links, and Google 's own research demonstrates that search-engine users
are unab le to distinguish between Sponsored Links and organic results and are confused when

tradernarks are used in the tex.t ofSponscred Links.
C.

The Functionality And First Sale Doctrines Have No Applicntion To Google's
Practices

Although Google does not characterize them as such in its opposition, it also relies on
two of its affumative defenses in an attempt to avoid summary judgment. Neither defense
provides a basis for denying Rosette Stone's motion.
trademarks

2.5

First, Google argues that "the use of

keywords is functional and therefore not actionable."

(Opp ' n at 13 .)

The

functionality doctrine, however, has no application to Google's sale of the Rosetta Stone Marks
to third parties:
The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote
competition by protecting a fum's reputation. from instead inhibiting legitimate
competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product feature. It is the
province of patent law, not trademark law, to encourage invention by granting
inventors a monopoly over new product designs or funct ions for a limited time, 35
U.S .c. §§ 154,1 73, after which competitors are free to use the innovation. If the
product's functional features could be used as trademarks, however, a monopOly
over such features could be obtained without regard to whether they qualify as
patents and could be extended forever (because trademarks may be renewed in
perpetuity).

12
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•

Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1995) (green-geld color of
press pads used in dry cleaning and laundry establishments was nO[ f..lI!ctional and

m~t

the basic

legal requirements for use as a trademark).

Thus, in TrafJu Devices, Inc. v,

.~{arketing

Disp!ays. /rIC. , Ihe Suprem<: Court concluded

that the plaintiffs dual-spring design for road signs was functional- it provided a "unique and
useful mechanism to resist the force of the wind" - and therefore was nor entitled to trade dress

protection. 523 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2001). Likewise, inSega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade. Inc., the
court found that an initialization code \-vas a functional feature that must be included in a video

game program in order for

me

game tc operate on plaintiffs video game system and that

defendant therefore could not be barred from using the code in manufacturing video games for
plaintiff's video game system 977 F.2d \510; 1530-31 (9th Cir. 1993). Here, the Rosetta Stone
Marks are not functional as they are not essential to the use or purpose of Rosetta Stone's
products and they do not affect the cost or quality of those products. The functionDlity doctrine
therefore is inapplicable. See Playboy Enters., 354- F.3d at 1031 (finding that function.lity
doctrme has no application to defendant search engine operators' use of plaintiff's trademarks:
"[t]he fact that the marks make defendallts' computer program more funcrionalis irrelevanC,):lo

"

In asserting that "(t]his Court has previously held that the mere use of trademarks as
keywords is insufficient to establish liability," Google mischaracterizes Judge Brinkcma's
opinion. Based on the faclual record before her, which consisted principally of an expert
survey that she rejected in significant part, she found that the "plaintiff has failed to establish
a likelihood of confusion stem.rning from Google's use ofG.E ICO' s {radell'.ark as a keyword
and., has not produced sufficient evidence to proceed On the question of whether the
Sponso red Links that do not reference GEICO's marks in their headings or text create a
sufficient likelihood of confusion to violate either the Lanham Act or Virginia common law."
GEICO, 2005 WL 1903128, at *7. She did not hold that Google's sale of trademarks.s
keywords is not actionable.
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Googie's reliance on

thl!

'Trrst sale doctrine" to justify its use of the Rosetta Stone Marks

is equally misplaced. (Opp'n" 15-16.) That doctrine is based on the premise ,hat ", ... demark

law does not apply to the sale of genuine goods bearing a true m.ark." Shell Oil Co. v.
Commercial Petroleum, inc., 928 F.2d 104, 1'07 (4th Cit. i 991). Thus, "a purchaser who does no

more than stock, display, and resell a producer's product under the producer's trademark violates
no right conferred upon the producer by the Lanham ACL" Sebastian Im'L Inc. v. Longs D11lg
Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9t h Cit. 1995). However, "conduct by the reseller other than

merely stocking and reselling genuine trademarked products may he sufficient to support e. cause
of action for infringement." Id. Here, Google and its customers do more than "stock, display,
and resell" genuine Rosetta Stone product under the Rosetta Stone Marks. The first Side doctrine
th~refore

is inapplicable.

Rosetta Stone bas proved direct trademark infringement.

II.

ROSETTA STOJli>: HAS PROVED SECONDARY TRADEMARK LIABILITY
To prove contriburory infringement, Rosetta Stone must prove trot Google "intentionally

induces another to infringe" or "continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or ha~
reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement." Inwood Labs., inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc. ,
456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). To prove vicarious infringement, Rosetta Stone must prove that

Google and its customers controlled the appearance ofth.e Sponsored Links on Google's searchresults pages and the use of Rosetta Stone's trademarks therein. GElCO, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 705
The undisputed facts support liability on all ofthese bases. (Rosella Stone Mem. at 24-27.)

The record evidence establishes that Google intentionally induces customers to bid on
trademarked terms as keyword triggers and to use tradcJ!18rked terms in the text and title ofrheir
Sponso red Links. (UF 30-33.) Google does not dispute these facts. COpp'n at 24-26.) Instead,
14
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it asserts that it can.'1ot be held contributorily liable for the infringement of its customers because
there is no evidence that Googte intended that its customers infringe the Rosetta Stone Marks.
(Jd. at 24-26.) [n so arguing, Googlc hides behind the facial neutrality of its practices - asserting
that

because its too ts look to historical data

be found to have "intentionally" mduced

and algorithmically predict search queries, it cannot

iiS

customers to infringe. (ld. at 25.) But the record

evidence sho\vs that (i) Google is aware of the infringing nature of Sponsored Li.ilks; and (ii)
nevenheless recommends to ail its customers that they bid on trademarked terms as keyword
triggers and use trademarked terms in Sponsored Link te..\."t. The fact that Google induces aU its
customers to engage in such conduct does not relieve it from liability when certain of those
customers in fact infringe.
The record evidence also establishes that Google continued

to sell the Rosetta Stone

Marks as ke}'\\'ords to individuals who it knew or had reason to know were selling counterfeit
Rosetta Stone goods. C[ Tiffany Illc. v. eBrI)'. Inc. , _ F.3d _, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 6735, at
*41 (2d Cir. Apr. I, 2010). Specifically, the Callioun declaration demonstrates that during the
'.:'

period September 2009 to March 2010, Rosetta Stone repeatedly contacted Google to request
thnt specific Sponsored Links be taken down on the basis that the sites to which Google was

;:,

directing traffic were selling counterfeit Rosetta Stone software. Bet\veen September 3, 2009
and March 1,2010, Rosetta Stone notified Google of nearly 200 instances of Sponsored Links to
counterfeit web sites.

(Dk~.

106.) Attached to

Mr. Callioun's declaration was a spreadsheet

reflecting the dates upon which Rosetta Stone found a counterfeit Sponsored Link on Google, the

dates upon whjch Rosetta Stone advised Google that the Sponsored Link was fraudulent, the
'.

domain names associated wilh each such Sponsored Link, the text of each such Sponsored Link,
and the date and substance of Google 's response. ({ti) This spreadsheet demonstrates thRl
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Google continued to auction the Rosetta Stone Marks to the same customers after Rosetta Stone
had ad:,ised Goog!e that the customers were selling counterfeit product

For example,

on November

16,

2009,

Rosetta Stone advised

Google

that

gainsoftrnall.com/rosettastoneCc:lorado was infringing Ras'etta Stone's marks. (See Calhoun Ex.

D-79.)" On that same day, Google advised Rosetta Stone that it had taken the infringing Link

uown.

(Id.l

On

November

17,

2009,

however,

Google

again

allowed

gainsoftmallcornlrosectastoneColorado to place an infringing Sponsored Link on a search-results

page fer a Rosetta Stone mark. (See id. Ex. D-7fi.) Rosetta Stone again advised Google of the
infringing Sponsored Link and , on November 18, 2009, Google: advised Rosetta Stone that it had

taken the infringing Link dow," (See iri) Then, on Noveruber 19, 2009, Google again allowed
gainsofirnall.comfrosettastone to place an infringing Sponsored Link on a search-results page for
a Rosetta Stone mark. (See id. Ex.. D-74.) These facts establish that Google was supplying its
service

to individuals who it knew were selling counterfeit Rosetta Stone goods.

(See also Dkt.

147. Rosert~ Stone Opp'n to GoogJe Mot. for Swn. Judg. at 21-24.> Because Google continued

to supply its product to known infringers, Goagle is liable far contributory infringement. 12

11

In shn..1' contrast to the specific notice provided by Rosetta Stone to Google, Tiffany 's
demand letters to eBay "did not identify particular sellers who Tiffany thought were then
offering or would offer counterfoit goods." Tiffany, 2010 U.S. App. LEYJS 6735, at ·4 1.

11

Contrary to Google's assertion, Rosetta Stone· is not seeking to impose an affJ!Inative duty on
Google to monitor and enforce its trademark rights. (Opp 'n at 27 It 13.) Rosetta Stone seeks
to preclude Google from selling the Rosetta Stone Marks to third parties. Nor would the
relief Rosetta Stone seeks "render operation ofGooglc's website impossible.:' (Id. ) Rosetta
Stone seeks only to revert back to Google's pre-2004 practices - when Google permitted
trademark owners to object to the sale of their trademarks as keywords. In fact, as a result of
its settlement of similar lawsuits brought by American Airlines and REfN1AX. Google
currently does not pennit thu'd parties to bid on "American Airlines" or HRFJMAX" as
. keywords.

16

6521

Finally, the record evidence demonstrates that Google controls both the appearance 0 f the
Sponsored Links that appear en its

~earch-;esuHs

pages

a.~d

the use ofthe Rosetta Stone lvlarks

in those Lin.l<s. (VF 29-33.) In response, Google argues only that it lacks an agency relationship

with its cusrQI!'£rs and therefore cannot be h~ld liable far·the conduct of irs customers. (Opp'n at
28.) In so arguing, Google teo narrowly construes vicarious infringement. Vicarious lia bility
arises not only when an agency relatio nship exists bur also when the «defendant and the infri.nger
'exercise joint ownership and control over (he infringing product ," GEICO, 330 F. Supp. 2d at

705. Thus, Judge Brinkema den ied Googte's motion to dismiss GEICO's vicarious infringement
claim where GEICO aUeged thot Google controls the appearance of the Spcnsored Links that

i'
I';'

L

appear an its search-resu lts pages and the use of GE ICO's n1arks therein. Jd. Because these
facts arc estab lished here, Google is liable to Rosetta Stone for vicarious infringement as well
Ill.

ROSETTA STONE HAS PROVED TRADEMARK DILUTION

To prove a dilution claL'll Rosetta Stone mus t demonstrate (t) that it owns a f3mous mark
that is distinctive; (2) that Google has commenced using a mark in conunerce that allegedly is

, ..

diluting Rosetta Stone's famous mark (3) that a similarity between Google 's mark and Rosetta

i.
~.~

Stone's fa mous mark gives rise to an association between the marles; and (4) [hat the association
is likely to impair the distinctiveness of the famous mark or likely to harm the reputation of the
famous mark. LOllis Vuitton Malietier SA. v. Haute Diggity Dog, UC, 507 F.3d 252, 264-65
(4th Cir. 2007); see also 15 V.S.c. § 1125(c)(I) (2006). Rosetta Stone has established these
dements. (Rosetta Stone Mem. at 27-29.)

Relying exclusively on the Second Circuit's recent decision in the Tiffany

y.

eBay case,

Google argues that it cannot be held liable for dilution because it "does nor use Rosetta Stone's
marks

(0

identify Google's own goods and services." . (Opp'n at 28.) Unlike eBay, however,
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Google in fact uses the Rosetta Stone Marks. It seils the Mark.; themselves to third parties and

displays Sponsored Links on
Google thus

engag~s

search-re~ult

pages when a user quuies a Rosetta Stone Mark.

in conduct that both blurs and tarnishes the RoseGa Stone Marks. In this

regard, courts routinely have found dilution by blurring where, as here, the defendant has used
the plaintiff's actual mark.

See, e.g., . Diane von Furstenberg Studio \/. Snyder, ).fo.

1:06cv1356(JCC), 2007 WL 2688184, at "4 CE.D. Va. Sept. 10, 2007) (granting pl'intiff

summary judgment on its dilution claim where the defendant used the identical mark); PETA v.
Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 915, 920 (E.D. Va. 2000), a!J'd, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001) (same).

Likewise, courts routinely have found dilution by tamishmenr where, as here, the plaintiffs mnrk
has been linked to counterfeit products. See, e.g., Diane von Furstenberg Studio: 2007 WI.
2688 184, at '4 (fmding tarnishment); Am. Oniine, Inc. v. LeGM, Il1c., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450
(ED . Va. 1998) (finding tamisiunent). For these reasons, Rosetta Stone is entitled to

SUl1Ullary

judgment on its trademark dil~tion claim. l )
IV.

ROSETTA STONE HAS PROVED UNJUST ENRICHMENT

Under Virginia law, a plaintiff seeking recovery foc unjust enricni·nent must show that (1)
~

"conferred" a benefit on the defendant, (2) the defendant knew of the benefit and sholl id

reasonably have expected to repay the plaintiff, and (3) the defendant accepted or retained the
benefit without paying for its vaiue. Nossen v. Hoy, 750 F. Supp. 740, 744-45 (E.D. Va. 1990).

Judge Davis recently explained that the word ....conferred" in this context includes situations in
!j

Google's assertion .that Rosetta Stone cannot show that its marks were famous by May of
2004 is factually and legally baseless. As a fuetua l malter, "Rosetta Stone" was a famous
mark in 2004. 'CSee Rosetta Stone Mem. at 27-29 & UF 1-4 & 8.) As a legal maner, this case
does not involve a situation where the defendant is usiug a mark similar to the plaintiffs
mark on its 0\.1-71 goods. Rather. this case involves Google's sale of the Rosetta Stone Marks
themselves. Given that Google uses the Rosetta Stone Marks because they are famous, its
attempt to avoid liability based on the date the MarkS became famous is untenable.
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which the defendant, without authorization, takes a benefit from the plaintiff even when the
plaintiff ha.s not voluntarily bestowed the benefit on the defendant. See In re Bay Vista of Va ..

Ene., No. 2:09cv46, 2009 WL 2900040, at *5 (E.D. Va. June 2, 2009).
GoogJe argues that it has not been unjustly enriched because it "has not
benefit from Rosetta Stone." (Opp'n at 29.)
trademark owner has no property right

i..."1

~taken'

any

Specifically, Google asserts that because "[a]

its mark beyond the right to prevent consumer

confusion as to source of its goods," it cannol have taken a benefit from Rosetta Stone unless its
actkms violate Rosetta SlOne's trademark rights. (ld. at 29-30. ) The cases cited by Google,
however, directly contradict its assertion as both make clear that a mark owner possesses
goodwill in its marks. See Presrollettes, inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) ("A trade-mark
cnly gives the right

iO

prohibit the use of it sofaI' as to prori!t:llhe owner's good will against Ihe

sale of another's product as his.") (emphasis added); United Drug Co. v. Theodore Reclanus Co.,
248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (trademark law's "function is simply to designate the goods as the
product of a particular trader and

(0

protect hi'i good will 3gamst the sale of another's product

2S

his; and it is not the subject of property except in connection with an existing business")
(emphasis added); see also George & Co., 575 FJd at 392-93 (recognizing that a trademark
protects " the goodwill represented by parricular marks"). Here, Google has taken the goodwill in
the Rosetta Stone Marks and sold it to third parties for Google's own benefit. It thus has taken a
benefit from Rosetta Stone.
Google also argues that it is entitled to sununary jud~ment because there is no record
evidence that Goog1e promised to pay for the use of the Rosetta Stone Marks. (Opp'n at 30.)
The promise to pay, however, "is

im~lied

from the consideration received:'

Appleton v.

BOl1durant & Appleton. P.c., 67 Va. Cir. 95, 2005 .\VL 517491, at +6 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2005)
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(citations-omitted); see aiso Po River Water and Sewer Co. v. Indian Acres Club of Thornburg,

Inc., 255 Va. 108, ! 14-15 (1998). Here, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Google took
without authorization the Rosetta. Stone Marks and made them available to twd parties at

auctions hosted by Google. It also is undisputed that Google derived considerable profits from
the unauthorized auction of the Rosetta Smne Marks. The promise to pay for ltJjs benefit is
implied iIllaw from the unaUlhorized taking and subsequent sale of the Rosetta Stone Marks.
CONCLUSION

Rosetta Stone's. motion for partial summary judgment should be granted.
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